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Abstract
Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so 
deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly 
absurd and impossible (Gilbert Ryle, Adam Bugeja) or is possible and only the speech act is absurd (Sarah 
McGrath). Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal iden-
tity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths—especially those that are emotional, widely held, 
subjectively important, and contribute to social relationships—cannot be forgotten because they’re too 
tightly tied to one’s true self. Moral knowledge at the level of individual propositions, when it does not have 
these attributes and so is not so tied to the agent’s identity, can sometimes be forgotten. I identify two such 
cases: (1) where the moral knowledge results partly from an emotional trigger that has been forgotten, and 
(2) where the moral knowledge results partly from a process of reflection that has been forgotten.
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Luke Skywalker: Ben! Why didn’t you tell me? You told me that Darth Vader 
betrayed and murdered my father.
Obi-Wan: Your father . . . was seduced by the Dark Side of the Force. He ceased 
to be the Jedi Anakin Skywalker and became the Sith Darth Vader. When that 
happened, the good man who was your father was destroyed. So, what I told 
you was true . . . from a certain point of view.
—Star Wars: The Return of the Jedi (1983)
1. Introduction to the Puzzle
1.1 Introduction
(0) “Sorry that my sister killed your son. It’s such a shame. She’s never normally 
like that, and she was so embarrassed when I reminded her that murder is wrong. 
She’s just really forgetful generally, you see. Only yesterday, she forgot how old she 
was.”
Statements like the one above (0) seem fundamentally absurd. Whatever moral knowl-
edge is, it seems like it certainly can’t be forgotten as described in the case above. Loss of 
moral knowledge over time does indeed occur. A person can be, for example, corrupted, 
but there is something deeply odd about describing it as forgetting. This is the puzzle of 
moral forgetting: if moral knowledge can be forgotten, why does it seem so absurd? If 
moral knowledge cannot be forgotten, why not, and is it really knowledge?
In section 2, I consider and criticize three unsuccessful views defended in the literature. 
Gilbert Ryle (1958) claims that the absurdity of moral forgetting is best explained by 
motivational internalism and the constitutive role one’s cares play in numerical identity, 
but I find this implausible.1 Adam Bugeja claims that noncognitivist expressivism best 
explains the puzzle, but he does little to explain why desires cannot be forgotten, and 
his account struggles to explain the absurdity of embedded moral propositions.2 Sarah 
McGrath, on the other hand, sees herself as diffusing the puzzle—by claiming that the 
absurdity is merely an artifact in first-person assertion—to defend the existence of cog-
nitivist moral knowledge.3 I find her example problematic, and the seeming absurdity 
1  Gilbert Ryle, “On Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong,” in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. 
A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958).
2  Adam Bugeja, “Forgetting Your Scruples,” Philosophical Studies 173, no. 11 (2016): 2889–911.
3  Sarah McGrath, “Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong,” in Intuition, Theory, and Anti-
Theory in Ethics, ed. Sophie Grace Chappell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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of moral forgetting persists in third-person cases, which she predicts it does not. All of 
these accounts, however, are unified in that they use the absurdity of moral forgetting as 
a desideratum for theories of moral judgment. 
In section 3, I present my own position. In short, it is that moral forgetting seems ab-
surd because, implicitly, we consider moral knowledge necessary for numerical identity 
and not because of the nature of moral judgment; a person who forgets the difference 
between right and wrong has become so incredibly broken, so fundamentally changed, 
that they’re no longer the same person who previously held the moral knowledge, so 
describing it as forgetting seems incorrect. This place for morality at the very core of 
people’s conception of personal identity is admittedly very strong, but there is a wealth 
of empirical research into the so-called true self that supports this, which I expand on 
in section 3.1. When moral forgetting is described to have occurred in such a way that 
personal identity is not threatened, it ceases to seem absurd. If my response to the puzzle 
is successful, then the puzzle does not warrant either motivational internalism or non-
cognitivism, and our implicit usage of moral judgment as a concept is consistent with 
cognitivism.
 1.2 Unproblematic Moral Forgetting
First, though, it is worth clarifying the problem. There are many kinds of moral forget-
ting, only some of which are philosophically problematic. There are at least three ways 
moral forgetting can be considered unproblematic because it is not moral in the appro-
priate way.
First, moral terms are sometime used when making inverted commas moral judgments, 
and not to express our own actual beliefs.4 For example, a woman brought up Catholic, 
but who left the religion very young, could ask, “is masturbation a sin?”, forgetting the 
Catholic doctrine regarding masturbation, rather than her own opinion of it. When talk-
ing in such a way, moral forgetting is unproblematic, as it is not strictly speaking forget-
ting a moral fact, but rather forgetting a non-evaluative fact (that some system or agent 
holds a moral belief).
Second, unproblematic moral forgetting may occur when moral facts are parasitic to 
some degree on nonmoral facts which in turn can be forgotten. If I do not see a friend 
for many years, it could be that I have forgotten what a good person they are, and then 
am pleasantly reminded of this fact when at long last we are reunited and we again spend 
time together. This is, in a sense, moral forgetting: a moral property has been forgotten. 
What is occurring, though, is not that I have forgotten that, for example, being kind, 
4  See R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
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and selfless, and loving are all morally good attributes, but rather I had forgotten that 
this specific friend so fully exemplified those good attributes. Bugeja refers to this as 
loss resulting from nonnormative forgetting (LRNF), and this is not the type of moral 
forgetting under discussion here.5 However, if on the other hand I had remembered that 
that specific friend was kind, but forgotten whether being kind was a good thing, then 
something altogether more mysterious would be occurring. Similarly, somebody could 
forget whether the Doctrine of Triple Effect is a morally good principle simply because it 
is reasonably complex and they may have forgotten what it actually meant.6
Third, beliefs are often moralized. This is to say that though the belief is not about moral 
status, the belief itself may be considered to hold moral value or be an indicator of a 
person’s moral deficiency. For example, believing that the Holocaust did not happen is 
not in itself a belief about anything’s moral status, but it is typically a moralized belief, in 
the sense that it is a belief that people often show moral outrage toward. There is nothing 
puzzling or paradoxical about forgetting such beliefs.
The above cases are unproblematic because they aren’t moral in the appropriate sense, 
but an ostensible case of moral forgetting can also be unproblematic because the sense 
of forgetting being used is merely rhetorical or metaphorical. Bugeja offers an example: 
“Through years of corporate pressures and the incessant call of the rat race, he simply 
forgot that other people have rights.”7
In this case, it seems as though nothing has been literally forgotten. Bugeja claims that 
one way that we can identify such cases is that, though they sound reasonable in the 
third person, they sound absurd in the first. As we shall see, McGrath has a perhaps more 
compelling explanation of this distinction, and I shall not use it as a criterion.8 Nonethe-
less, I do take the above case as metaphorical, and it can be identified as such by con-
sidering the associated phenomenology and behavioral symptoms of forgetting.9 Could 
the person in the example above be reminded that people do in fact have rights by some 
friend, or could he have prevented forgetting that people have rights by writing himself 
5  Bugeja, “Forgetting Your Scruples,” 2892. 
6  Frances M. Kamm, “The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend the Means 
to His End,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74, no. 1 (2000): 21–39; Bugeja, “Forgetting Your 
Scruples.”
7  Bugeja, “Forgetting Your Scruples,” 2894.
8  McGrath, “Forgetting the Difference.”
9  Bugeja, “Forgetting Your Scruples.”
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a reminder? Of course not. Such cases seem to somehow fundamentally miss the point.
Considering forgetting as a whole cluster of behaviors and phenomenology has two ad-
ditional benefits: it is more likely to be directed at forgetting as a concept and not merely 
as a speech act; and it is more trustworthy if we are using a concept that lacks neat and 
tidy necessary and sufficient conditions.
1.3 Considerations within Problematic Moral Forgetting
Forgetting has, I hold it, at least two necessary features. The first and most obvious is 
that remembering has not occurred, that some information has been lost. The second 
is persistence of identity. Forgetting does not occur when one person knew something, 
and then a completely different person at a later point does not. It is important here to 
distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity. Qualitative identity is a matter of 
degree in similarity between two entities in the properties they hold. A mass-produced 
rubber ball, for example, may be qualitatively identical to another ball of the same kind, 
and indeed identical to thousands of such balls. Numerical identity, on the other hand, 
is categorical; it either obtains or does not, rather than being a matter of degree, and an 
entity can only be numerically identical with itself.10 
Of these two, it is only numerical identity that is important for remembering and for-
getting. A person may be qualitatively very different from their younger self, and loss 
of information is still forgetting. If numerical identity does not hold, however—if they 
lose whatever it is that determines who they are—then forgetting is impossible; the later 
person never held the information which ostensibly has been forgotten.
Previous authors, when considering the puzzle, have looked at it from different perspec-
tives. Bugeja addresses the absurdity of forgetting moral propositions, but Ryle and Mc-
Grath address the absurdity of forgetting the difference between right and wrong, where 
that difference is seen as a capacity, not as a set of propositions.11 According to some 
views, all knowledge at the level of capacities can be reduced to knowledge of proposi-
tions, but this is controversial and I certainly won’t presume it here. Moral knowledge 
being a capacity of the right sort could explain why loss of knowledge of a specific moral 
10  Note here that my claim is about entities; I am not claiming that anything which is forgotten can be 
remembered; rather I am claiming that if the knowledge cannot in principle be remembered because the 
knowledge is, in structure, of the wrong kind, then it cannot be forgotten either.
11  Bugeja, “Forgetting Your Scruples”; Ryle, “On Forgetting the Difference”; McGrath, “Forgetting the 
Difference.”
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proposition is not a case of forgetting,12 but it is not an explanation for why the capacity 
itself cannot be forgotten. As Ryle points out with the example of Latin, capacities too 
can be forgotten.13 
2. Three Unsuccessful Accounts
 2.1 Ryle: Cares and Identity
“What,” Ryle asks us, “is the absurdity in a person forgetting the difference between right 
and wrong?” Note that the question Ryle is asking is not about  forgetting specific moral 
propositions. He considers knowing the difference between right and wrong “more a 
mastery of techniques, rather than a possession of information. It is a capacity.”14 
Ryle’s explanation presumes an internalist view whereby moral knowledge necessarily 
includes a motivation:15 to be able to list accurately which actions are good and which 
are bad, but not care one jot about the difference between them is to misunderstand 
morality too fundamentally to obtain the status of knowledge. For Ryle, if one knows 
the difference between right and wrong one must at least possess (1) “a competence to 
label correctly” and (2) “an inculcated caring.”16 It is this second criteria upon which his 
argument hinges.
Though McGrath interprets Ryle differently, what I find key to Ryle’s account is his em-
phasis on identity: “A person who becomes less or more conscientious is a somewhat 
changed person, not a person with an enlarged or diminished stock of anything.”17 The 
point for Ryle is not that a change in cares is not a change in information held, and 
therefore not forgetting (though that is true); the point is that a change in cares entails 
12  Consider if I forget how to do long division, and am then presented with a mathematical question 
which requires long division but which I’ve never seen before. It is unfair to say that I have forgotten the 
answer—I have never seen it before; I have forgotten the capacity.
13  Ryle, “On Forgetting the Difference,” 149-159.
14  Ryle, “On Forgetting the Difference,” 149.
15  Although this form of internalism is uncommon in contemporary philosophy, it is entailed by the much 
more common motivational internalism about moral judgment. It could even be said to be preferable 
because it is more modest in that can also accommodate, for example, knowledge-first accounts of 
knowledge (Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000]).
16  Ryle, “On Forgetting the Difference,” 156.
17  Ibid. 156. 
Bilbrough | Memory and the True Self
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1280 | 7
a change in person, and therefore is not forgetting. Forgetting occurs when the agent 
remains constant (in a fundamental sense) and their knowledge or capacity varies. “In 
a testimonial,” Ryle says, “both personal qualities and equipment need to be mentioned, 
but the equipment is not mentioned among the personal qualities.” This, though the 
most direct account of his view, is cryptic: Ryle means that remembering (or “a testimo-
nial”) has conditions on persons themselves (“personal qualities”) as well as what they 
can do (“equipment”), but states (such as forgetting) regarding what they can do (their 
“equipment”), can’t be facts about who they are (“personal qualities”).18 
Ryle is a little ambiguous, and he never explicitly discusses numerical identity. I am in-
terpreting him as taking personal qualities to mean those qualities that determine your 
personal identity. It is of course possible that he does not consider cares as part of one’s 
numerical identity and considers cares only as part of qualitative identity, but then it is 
very mysterious why it is that anything that involves cares should be impossible to forget. 
My ability to speak Spanish is a “personal quality” in the sense that it is about me, and 
part of my qualitative identity, but of course I can forget it.
We should interpret Ryle in the strongest sense, that indicating that moral knowledge is 
part of someone’s identity by virtue of being one of their cares. This requires a form of es-
sentialist view of personal identity whereby all of a person’s cares are very fundamentally 
who they are, not just in cases of forgetting but generally. In cases where cares change, 
personal identity is not maintained. This is a very strong claim, given how much people’s 
cares typically change over the course of a lifetime (though there remains some ambigu-
ity about how inclusive Ryle is regarding what counts as a care). Even generously using 
a more restrictive account of cares Ryle’s account seems to problematically overattribute 
loss of personal identity. Consider the following case:
(1) When Joe was a young man he was deeply in love with his boyfriend, Tomás. 
For Joe, part of loving Tomás was constituted by caring for him deeply. After a 
couple of years of dating, Tomas and Joe had a particularly nasty break up and 
never spoke to each other again. Suffice to say, Joe stopped caring for Tomás.19
Ryle’s account implies that Later Joe is not the same man as Earlier Joe. He lost his cares, 
and so became literally a different person. It would be wrong, for example, to even say 
of the later Joe that “he used to loved Tomás.” Later Joe is a different man. Later Joe has 
18  Ibid. 156.
19  Ibid. 156.
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never loved Tomás. For Ryle, no person has ever fallen out of love, because to stop loving 
somebody is not lose your love for them, it is for the person who loved them to die and 
be replaced by a new loveless person. This may be poetic, but it certainly doesn’t seem 
literally true, and I wish good luck to anybody trying to use it in divorce proceedings. 
 2.2 McGrath: Idiosyncratic Perspectival Blindness
McGrath’s own explanation takes a slightly different approach to explaining the appar-
ent absurdity of forgetting the difference between right and wrong.20 McGrath also takes 
knowing the difference between right and wrong to be a capacity as it requires being “a 
competent judge” of it in yourself. McGrath makes no presumptions about motivational 
internalism, however.
McGrath claims that it is very important to distinguish between moral forgetting proper, 
and the speech act of asserting that you have forgotten a moral fact. In her view one can 
forget the difference between right and wrong, but that the speech act is absurd in the 
first person. This is due to an idiosyncratic perspectival blindness in admitting the loss of 
knowledge;21 when a person forgets the difference between right and wrong, they simul-
taneously lose the ability to recognize a good sense of right and wrong.
For McGrath, we can see cases where the puzzles dissolves (i.e. moral forgetting is not 
absurd) when the capacity being measured (person A’s sense of right and wrong) differs 
from the standard it is being measured against (person B’s sense of right and wrong). 
There is nothing therefore paradoxical about people asserting moral forgetting of other 
people or of themselves in the past. McGrath gives an example:
The Corruption of my Congressman. When my congressman first ran for 
elected office, I strongly supported him. That support was in part predicated 
on my high opinion of his moral sensibility and outlook. Based on his past 
behavior as a private citizen, I had a high degree of confidence in the moral 
judgments that he would be disposed to make about (e.g.) policies affecting the 
poor. In any case, I would have unhesitatingly described him as “someone who 
knows the difference between right and wrong.” However, in the years since he 
assumed office, I have grown increasingly disillusioned. I now believe that his 
moral outlook is seriously defective in various ways. It is not that I believe that 
I was wrong about what his moral outlook was years ago; rather, I think his 
moral outlook has changed for the worse. I believe that he is no longer disposed 
20  McGrath, “Forgetting the Difference.”
21  Roy Sorensen, Blindspots (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
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to make many of the correct moral judgments that he once would have made. 
In fact, I describe his evolution like this: “He once knew the difference between 
right and wrong, but somewhere along the way, he forgot it.”22
I find this example interesting. I very strongly do not share McGrath’s intuition and 
very decidedly think that the congressman has not literally forgotten anything (though 
the statement makes sense by virtue of its metaphorical meaning). McGrath is quick to 
clarify that she does not mean the congressman is behaving in nonideal ways because of 
political expediency or the like, as that would only be metaphorical forgetting. Granting 
that, I still think that this case is not true moral forgetting, but for two reasons it is easy 
to mistake as such. First, it is easy to mistake LRNF for true moral forgetting; the con-
gressman has forgotten what the best policies would be because he has forgotten many 
nonnormative facts about what life is like for the poor (for example, he has forgotten the 
material hardship, or lack of opportunity, and so on). Second, the beliefs he is likely to 
have forgotten (i.e., the poor lack opportunity, and so are poor through lack of effort) are 
often moralized. Believing that the poor are poor because they don’t work hard enough 
is not itself a moral belief, but it certainly is a moralized one, in the sense that it can be 
met with moral outrage.
To be a true example of moral forgetting in the sense we are interested in, the congress-
man would need to forget what kind of things are good; however, if we imagine him 
losing pure moral beliefs (i.e., that the poor deserve opportunity) then it seems bizarre 
to describe this as a literal case of forgetting. It makes sense to say when the congress-
man lost the moralized belief, that he could perhaps go work among the poor and be 
reminded of it (i.e., “I had completely forgotten how little opportunity there is!”) but it 
would seem very odd if he worked among the poor and said “I had totally forgotten that 
poor people deserve opportunity!”23
Furthermore, even if the corrupted congressman case does seem like literal forgetting, 
McGrath’s example would predict that all third-person attributions of moral forgetting 
22  Ibid., 
23  I want to be clear that given that my explanation is of the intuition. There is variety in how people form 
intuitions and where they draw the line; I am open to considering that maybe McGrath may consider 
the congressman when they change in their pure moral beliefs (i.e. they used to believe that reducing the 
material hardship of those in living in poverty is morally important and then stopped) as having forgotten 
something, but I think this will be a minority intuition. As discussed in 3.1, not all moral beliefs are equally 
important to a person’s numerical identity. To the extent that a person considers moral forgetting in the 
congressman case possible it will be because they think that moral beliefs regarding policies affecting those 
living in poverty are not widely held, not subjectively important, not contributing to social relationships, 
and not emotionally formed.
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are unproblematic, which is a much harder pill to swallow in other circumstances. To 
illustrate, let’s return to statement (0) from the introduction: 
(0) “Sorry that my sister killed your son. It’s such a shame. She’s never normally 
like that and she was so embarrassed when I reminded her that murder is 
wrong. She’s just really forgetful, you see. Only yesterday, she forgot how old 
she was.”
Regardless of whether McGrath’s prediction that third-person assertions of moral forget-
ting are not problematic, how well does her explanation work in the case of first person? 
As an explanation of the absurdity of first-person assertions of moral forgetting, it is 
problematic also. 
Firstly, the absurdity of recognizing that you yourself have forgotten something only ap-
plies in cases where a person’s accurate moral sense is replaced by a faulty moral sense. 
If a person forgets the difference between right and wrong, and is left merely with un-
certainty (as in Ryle’s example), then there is no paradox of assertion. There is noth-
ing paradoxical about believing “I used to believe something, but I don’t know what to 
believe now, because I have forgotten.” Consider a nonmoral parallel: there is nothing 
contradictory about a person being aware that they used to know Spanish but now have 
forgotten it, because where before they used to be able to conjure up words upon trying, 
now when they try nothing comes to mind.
Secondly, it is possible for an agent to introspectively assess their own capacity as incor-
rect without any external measure. This is because, even by measures available internally, 
it can be obviously faulty—for example, if it is inconsistent or self-contradictory. A per-
son’s intellectual capacity to give an answer is separate from that person also endorsing 
that answer. Consider the following statement:
(2) I used to be able to do long division, but I think that I’ve forgotten how. I 
keep on trying to do this same question and get a different answer every time.
McGrath’s diffusion therefore of the problem seems to fail. Closer inspection of third-
person attributions of moral forgetting seem equally absurd, against McGrath’s predic-
tion, and even in first-person cases would only apply to the subset of cases of where the 
forgotten moral sense has been replaced by a faulty but internally coherent moral sense.
2.3 Bugeja: Noncognitivist Moral Knowledge
Bugeja aims his discussion of forgetting at the level of knowledge of moral propositions, 
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rather than the capacity in general.24 However if his noncognitivist explanation is suc-
cessful about propositions, it thereby functions also at this deeper level.
Bugeja is explicit in refusing to commit himself to many claims often associated with 
noncognitivism—such as that moral judgments are not beliefs and cannot be true, fac-
tive, or representational—in order to leave open a deflationary account of these con-
cepts. Moral judgments, on Bugeja’s specific form of noncognitivism, are a special kind 
of desire-like attitude that is noncognitive by virtue of lacking informational content.25 
There is one possible view, discussed by McGrath, whereby moral knowledge is said 
to not exist because all knowledge can be forgotten, something which does not obtain 
in the moral case. Bugeja, to be clear, is not doing this. Given the way Bugeja uses the 
term moral knowledge, it is fair to assume that he categorizes himself as alongside “most 
non-cognitivists (who) will want to say that some of our desire-like attitudes constitute 
knowledge.” He is not trying to diffuse the paradox of moral forgetting by claiming that 
moral knowledge does not exist; rather, he is claiming that it is predicated on a kind of 
mental state whose loss is not forgetting because it lacks information.
Bugeja does admit that other noncognitivist states, such as intentions,26 can be forgotten, 
but that the main advantage of such a view (accounting for disagreement) is overstated. 
It is not exactly clear why Bugeja thinks that desires specifically cannot be forgotten. 
Perhaps it is because desires do not convey information, but intentions do (though he 
provides no argument for this). 
Even in the very example that he uses, of going to the shops and forgetting that you in-
tended to buy milk, one natural way of understanding the forgetting of intentions would 
be to cast it in terms of forgetting desires—I forgot that I intended to buy milk because I 
forgot that I wanted milk. Though on some accounts intention does reduce to some set 
including desires in a simple and straightforward way,27 in most contemporary accounts 
it does not, so this analysis would be problematic. Nonetheless we can find cases where 
desires are decidedly not part of an intention and yet have been forgotten. Consider this 
statement:
24  Bugeja, “Forgetting Your Scruples.”
25  Bugeja says this in response to the threat articulated against such views by James Dreier (“Meta-Ethics 
and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism,” Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 [2004]: 23–44).
26  See Allan Gibbard, “Thinking How to Live,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, no. 3 (2006): 
729–44.
27  Neil Sinhababu, “The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything,” 
Noûs 47 (2013): 680–96. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00864.x
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(3) In recognition of Ramadan, Mo fasted from sun-up to sun-down. 
Throughout the day, Mo was very hungry and thirsty and desired to eat and 
drink, but, of course, had no intention of doing so until sundown. Whilst he 
was at work however, he had a particularly hectic day, and was so busy that he 
forgot he was hungry, though his hunger caused him to be unusually tired and 
grumpy.
In this case, it seems as though Mo has forgotten about his desire, though not lost the de-
sire itself. He was just too busy to recognize it. This is problematic for Bugeja, because if 
desires are forgettable, then identifying moral judgments with desire-like attitudes does 
not explain why forgetting moral knowledge seems so absurd.
Of course, not all expressivists identify moral judgments with desires or intentions, and 
on some views it seems much more reasonable to claim that their loss does not constitute 
forgetting. Expressivist views generally however face a further problem. Even granting 
that an expressivist analysis explains the absurdity of forgetting moral judgments, the 
absurdity of moral forgetting extends to beliefs about moral judgments. Consider a pair 
of sentences:
(4) Anna forgot that random violence was morally bad. 
(5) Anna forgot that she believes that random violence is morally bad.
Insofar as case (4) seems absurd, I take it that case (5) also seems absurd; both seem like 
conceptual mistakes. On a standard cognitivist reading, the content of both case (4) and 
case (5) is the same: Anna used to believe that random violence was bad, but then lost 
that belief through forgetting. This does not explain why moral forgetting seems absurd, 
but note that cognitivism makes no distinction between the pair; any successful expla-
nation will apply to both. On an expressivist reading, however, the content of these two 
statements is different; the content of case (4) is that Anna had a special kind of expres-
sivist attitude against random violence; the content of case (5) is that Anna believes she 
has a special kind of expressivist attitude against random violence. The noncognitivist 
therefore has given no reason why case (5) seems absurd, and furthermore seems absurd 
in the same way as case (4). To explain the absurdity of case (5), the noncognitivist will 
have to posit some further explanation as to why beliefs can’t be forgotten when they’re 
about moral knowledge, at which point the whole motivation for being a noncognitivist 
has been lost.
3. My Account
3.1 When Moral Knowledge Cannot Be Forgotten: The True Self
Although I disagree with Ryle that one’s cares are too fundamental to one’s identity to be 
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forgotten, I do agree with his general point. I can forget to take my keys to work when I 
leave in the morning, I can forget my partner’s birthday, I can in certain circumstances 
forget who I am and what I want from life. In short, I can forget knowledge of every 
single fact about myself. What I cannot forget, however, is the very knowledge by which 
I am myself. If in losing some knowledge I literally cease to be the person I was, then I 
have not forgotten anything because the person who held the information previously was 
not me.
This requires, admittedly, a very strong link between moral knowledge and personal 
identity. My claim is not that all moral propositions known by an agent are tied to one’s 
identity in this very strong form, nor is it that moral identity is entirely constitutive of 
one’s identity, but that loss of moral knowledge can lead to loss of identity. 
There is ample evidence that people typically think of themselves as moral, and that this 
is central to their own self-concept.28 Indeed this self-conception is fundamental to most 
cases of cognitive dissonance29 and can even motivate the forgetting of moral rules.30 
Making people believe or at least increase the salience of a link between morality and an 
identity they hold is typically a good way to alter their moral behavior.31 General moral 
deterioration is taken to constitute a larger change than other comparable psychologi-
28  Karl Aquino and Americus Reed, “The Self-Importance of Moral Identity.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 83, no. 6 (2002): 1423–40.
29  Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Vol. 2 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
30  See Lisa L. Shu, Francesca Gino, and Max Bazerman, “Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: When Cheating 
Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37, 
no. 3 (2011): 330–49; and Lisa L. Shu and Francesca Gino, “Sweeping Dishonesty under the Rug: How 
Unethical Actions Lead to Forgetting of Moral Rules,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102, no. 
6 (2012): 1164–77. To clarify, in these studies it is taken that participants engage in motivated forgetting of 
moral rules when they break them, but it is unclear how much they identify with the rules being forgotten 
(they could remember the rules but not agree with them), and furthermore they’re not forgetting if the 
rules are true, but rather which rules the moral code ascribed to (i.e. participants could believe in the 
principle, but not remember that they were part of the code they were told to remember).
31  This effect exists when they believe that they are good people in the abstract. Making people consider their 
own recent, concrete moral behaviors can lead to a licensing effect, which leads to less prosocial behavior 
(see Paul Conway and Johanna Peetz, “When Does Feeling Moral Actually Make You a Better Person? 
Conceptual Abstraction Moderates whether Past Moral Deeds Motivate Consistency or Compensatory 
Behavior,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38, no. 7 (2012): 907–19). For a review, see Steven G. 
Hertz and Tobias Krettenauer, “Does Moral Identity Effectively Predict Moral Behavior? A Meta-Analysis,” 
Review of General Psychology 20, no. 2 (2016): 129–40.
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cal traits32 and specifically a deterioration in moral values is taken to constitute a larger 
change than a loss of memory or narrative self, even when an agent’s moral change was 
the result of that agent’s decision.33 
Though all this does show that morality is typically linked to identity, it does not itself 
demonstrate that losing moral knowledge is taken to pose a challenge to a person’s nu-
merical identity. Interestingly, when asked about a more modest link between morality 
and identity, many of the participants were very willing to assign some kind of moral 
core this stronger determinative role:
“His moral code and personality is what made him who he was. If that changes 
then the person changes with it.”34
“Our moral conscience, our moral compass, is a huge component of what 
makes up our identity and our soul.”
“‘The surgery resulted in Jim losing his moral conscience and his ability to 
empathize with the sufferings of others. These are essential aspects of personal 
identity so I concluded that in a profound way Jim is no longer himself after the 
surgery.’’35  
The target of interest here is specifically the factors that constitute numerical identity, the 
facts that you are you, not the amount of similarity, or qualitative identity. Few authors 
use the terminology of numerical identity when discussing the true self.36 Some of the 
research is ambiguous. For example, people discussing real-life friends or family suffer-
ing neurodegenerative diseases were most likely to say that they no longer knew them, 
that they felt like a stranger, that they were no longer the same person underneath, and 
the change was deeper in cases of moral—compared to other kinds of psychological—
32  Nina Strohminger and Shaun Nichols, “The Essential Moral Self,” Cognition 131, no. 1 (2014): 159–
71; Sarah Molouki and Daniel M. Bartels, “Personal Change and the Continuity of the Self,” Cognitive 
Psychology 93 (2017): 1–17.
33  Jesse J. Prinz and Shaun Nichols, “Diachronic Identity and the Moral Self,” in The Routledge Handbook 
of Philosophy of the Social Mind, ed. Julian Kiverstein (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
34  Ibid., 
35  Strohminger and Nichols, “Essential Moral Self,” 
36  Though some very explicitly do; see, for example Larisa Heiphetz, Nina Strohminger, and Liane L. 
Young, “The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity,” Cognitive 
Science 41, no. 3 (2017): 744–67.
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deterioration;37 these statements, like the quotes above, can be taken to point toward 
numerical identity, but certainly don’t prove it. However, many of the proxies used to ask 
about the true self are more directly measures of numerical identity: for example, ask-
ing which attributes would survive reincarnation, would swap bodies if a person’s soul 
moved bodies, and determine if a hypothetical Jim is still Jim after brain surgery. When 
asked in these ways, people gave the same response as when they were asked directly 
about people’s true self: moral deterioration was a greater challenge to identity persisting 
than loss of perceptual capacities, desires, (nonmoral) cognitive capacities, personality, 
memory, or experiences.38 There are other reasons to think that people are using the true 
self to mean numerical identity. For example, misanthropes with very negative explicit 
beliefs about people still believe that the true self is good, which would be obviously 
contradictory if they’re using the true self to mean qualitative identity. Similarly, the fact 
that the true self is seen as immutable and generally essentialist39 is bizarre if they’re de-
scribing qualitative identity, as qualitative identity obviously changes dramatically over 
a lifetime. Indeed, the only group who systematically dispute that the true self is good 
are not those with different beliefs about people, but rather those with a psychopathic 
attitude toward morality itself.40
The claim is not that a person’s fundamental identity is entirely determined by their 
moral core generally. But moral deterioration does seem to threaten the persistence of 
identity especially. Compared to moral improvements or morally neutral changes, moral 
deterioration is considered quantitatively more of a change to identity41 and a change at 
much more fundamental level of identity.42
37  Nina Strohminger and Shaun Nichols, “Neurodegeneration and Identity,” Psychological Science 26, no. 
9 (2015): 1469–79.
38  Strohminger and Nichols, “Essential Moral Self.”
39  Andrew G. Christy, Rebecca J. Schlegel, and Andrei Cimpian, “The Essence of the Individual: The 
Pervasive Belief in the True Self Is an Instance of Psychological Essentialism,” preprint, submitted October 
24, 2017. Retrieved from psyarxiv.com/k3jba.
40  Nina Strohminger and Shaun Nichols, “Psychopathy and the Moral Self,” unpublished manuscript, 2016.
41  Molouki and Bartels, “Personal Change”; Strohminger and Nichols, “Essential Moral Self ”; Prinz and 
Nichols, “Diachronic Identity.”
42  George E. Newman, Paul Bloom, and Joshua Knobe, “Value Judgments and the True Self,” Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 40, no. 2 (2014): 203–16; Kevin Patrick Tobia, “Personal Identity, Direction 
of Change, and Neuroethics,” Neuroethics 9, no. 1 (2016): 37–43; Strohminger and Nichols, “Essential 
Moral Self.”
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Most of these studies have taken moral deterioration to be a singular entity, counting 
together changes in moral judgment which could be considered loss of moral knowledge 
(i.e., from egalitarian to racist) with moral changes in behavior, which may be accompa-
nied by no change in moral judgment (i.e., from monogamous to promiscuous), and in 
a couple of cases even changes in moralized nonnormative beliefs (i.e., from skepticism 
to belief in global warming). Usefully for our purposes here, some have separated these 
more rigorously, and have equally found that deterioration in moral belief (and so loss 
of moral knowledge) is typically more likely to be seen as a change in numeric identity 
than an improvement in moral belief43 (Newman, Bloom and Knobe, 2013) or changes 
in other comparable psychological traits.44
The conception of people’s true self as good seems remarkably stable. There is no sig-
nificant difference in its belief when made about hypothetical third parties or the self,45 
and it is believed regarding out-group members, even out-group members who are con-
sidered stereotypically aggressive.46 This suggests that it is not reasoning motivated by a 
desire to protect positive images of loved ones. 
But what is it that is perceived to be happening in cases of moral deterioration? People 
switch relatively regularly between behaving morally and immorally within their lives. 
The idea here is not that they are performing a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde routine, where 
their selves are entirely split between two personalities, their good true self and another 
evil self. It is that only good behavior stems from their true self. A man who says that 
2+2=5 because he is commanded to say so when under hypnosis has not forgotten that 
2+2=4; rather, his assertion that 2+2=5 does not truly reflect him. 
The emphasis used to test loss of moral knowledge in these studies has emphasized loss 
of knowledge of moral propositions (though not exclusively), but if loss of knowledge 
of moral propositions constitutes change in identity, then so does loss of the capacity 
to form moral knowledge. After all, moral knowledge of propositions is formed by an 
appropriate ability to form knowledge, so if loss of the former constitutes loss of self, so 
should the latter. Admittedly the evidence doesn’t directly demonstrate this, but how a 
moral judgment is formed is taken to be fundamental to its legitimacy. Therefore, ap-
proaching it in an inappropriate fashion can cause outrage regardless of the judgment 
43  Newman, Bloom, and Knobe,  
44  Strohminger and Nichols, “Essential Moral Self.”
45  Prinz and Nichols, “Diachronic Identity.”
46  Julian De Freitas and Mina Cikara, “Deep Down My Enemy Is Good: Thinking about the True Self 
Reduces Intergroup Bias,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 74 (2018): 307–16.
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reached.47 It is, I think, reasonable to assume that somebody who used to know the dif-
ference between right and wrong, and then lost this capacity, would be fundamentally a 
different person even if they had a string of lucky guesses on moral questions or contin-
ued to often behave morally out of self-interest. 
Of course, when it comes specifically to the question of forgetting the difference between 
right and wrong, McGrath discusses the idea of it requiring some specific threshold of 
accuracy in moral beliefs. It is of course possible that if one considers a very high level of 
accuracy as a requirement for knowing the difference between right and wrong (one that 
is higher than the accuracy required to affect conceptions of selfhood) then there may 
be cases of intuitively reasonable moral forgetting (because the moral loss is too minor 
to threaten the True Self). It is important not to get too tied up in the question of specifi-
cally how accurate the capacity need be;48 the key point is that the structure is integral 
to one’s identity, and to the extent that it is lost or damaged, the stability of an agent’s 
fundamental identity is challenged, which can preclude forgetting.
Taken together, all this suggests that insofar as any meaningful concept of persistent 
identity exists, morality and moral knowledge are key to it, such that their loss can 
constitute a change in identity. Importantly though, not all kinds of moral judgment 
contribute equally to the true self. Newman, Bloom, and Knobe found that (though 
by far truth of moral belief was most important) there was also a slight tendency to 
consider emotional moral judgments as more reflective of the essential self than rational 
ones.49 Heiphetz, Strohminger, and Young found three main factors which affect whether 
moral changes are important or not:50 changes in widely held moral beliefs were seen 
47  Alan Page Fiske and Philip E. Tetlock, “Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress 
the Spheres of Justice,” Political Psychology 18, no. 2 (1997): 255–97; Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca, 
“Protected Values,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70, no. 1 (1997): 1–16; Tetlock 
et al., “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical 
Counterfactuals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78, no. 5 (2000): 853–70.
48 I suspect that precisely how morally accurate one need be to be considered “knowing the difference 
between right and wrong” is deeply subjective and not really worthy of philosophical discussion.
49  Newman, Bloom, and Knobe, “Value Judgments.”
50  Heiphetz, Strohminger, and Young, “Role of Moral Beliefs.” The authors seem to imply that the measure 
they use is of numerical identity, comparing it to the concept of identity used widely in social psychology. 
They asked people to rate from 0 (“remain the same person as before”) to 100 (“completely different now”) 
the amount of change undergone. I think that this measure, though not a measure of social identity, is 
at best ambiguous as numeric identity because it can easily be seen as qualitative identity. Given that 
participants in other studies emphasized the same features when asked about it in this ambiguous way as 
when asked about direct measures of numerical identity, we have good reason to suspect that the features 
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to represent a more significant change to identity than changes in controversial moral 
beliefs (which were not even significantly more linked to changes in identity than loss 
of memory); changes that were subjectively important to the people undergoing them 
were seen as more significant by participants than changes that were not subjectively 
important; and finally, moral changes that affected social relationships were seen as 
changing identity more than changes that didn’t affect social relationships. 
 3.2 When Moral Knowledge Can Be Forgotten: Two Cases
The next task, therefore, is to try to find cases where moral knowledge can be forgotten. 
Moral knowledge is varied and complexly formed, and my claim here is that it some-
times (at least in part) is the result of various processes that can fail to obtain due to for-
getting (in ways that do not challenge the true self). Therefore moral knowledge, I take 
it, can be forgotten. I give two examples of moral knowledge being forgotten, and explain 
the structure of them: (1) when moral knowledge requires remembering an emotional 
trigger, and (2) when moral knowledge requires remembering a conclusion justified 
through lengthy reflection. Both of these processes, we have strong reason to believe, 
play some causal role in the formation of moral judgments, at least sometimes, which 
I explain. I do not believe that these two structures are the only ways of forming moral 
knowledge where moral forgetting can be said to occur, but they are the strongest cases 
I can think of. 
I have endeavored as far as possible to make both examples cases where the moral 
knowledge is not emotionally formed, widely held, subjectively important to identity, 
or affecting social relationships to ensure that the true self is not threatened and forget-
ting is possible. This has the unfortunate effect that my examples of moral knowledge 
(veganism and luck egalitarianism) may be disputed by readers as being true, but being 
controversial moral truths is an unfortunate necessity. For what it is worth, though, both 
examples I use are drawn from first-person experience.
My first case is the following:
(6) Kim has always known that eating meat causes the death and pain of 
animals, but had never considered it immoral to eat meat. Many of her friends 
are vegan but most are not, so socially speaking, being vegan or a meat eater 
is relatively easy either way. One day Kim visited a slaughterhouse and, for the 
first time, actually saw a live pig be killed for meat. There’s no new fact which 
Kim learned, and Kim struggled to explain it logically, but somehow actually 
seeing an animal die in front of her own eyes changed her perspective, and she 
found in this study are central to numerical identity.
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decided that she must become vegan. 
The next morning, however, Kim awoke, and performed her normal Sunday 
morning ritual of going with her flatmates for a fry-up. Instinctively she 
ordered her habitual full English breakfast replete with bacon and eggs. One of 
her friends turned to her and said, “I thought going to the slaughterhouse made 
you vegan.” In a sudden rush, embarrassed, Kim remembered seeing the pigs 
die the day before and hurriedly changed her order.
It is, I think, implausible to claim that Kim had forgotten that bacon is made from pigs, 
nor that pigs feel pain. She had not forgotten the fact; she had forgotten the emotional 
trigger. That emotional trigger caused her to have an emotional response that caused 
her to reach a conclusion on the moral status of eating meat. In my experience, the case 
above is actually very common; most vegans and vegetarians (including myself) have 
forgotten that they think meat is immoral at some point, typically when they first started 
changing their diet, and there are plentiful examples online that explicitly refer to this 
moral epistemic loss as forgetting.51 
This labeling presumes that emotion can play a causal role in forming moral judgments. 
I think we have very good reason to believe this. For example, when considering highly 
emotionally evocative cases, people often are completely unable to articulate a justifica-
tion for their moral beliefs, though they consider one appropriate.52 Priming and manip-
ulation of emotions, particularly disgust, have a strong influence on moral judgments.53 
51  Nina Marinello, “I Almost Forgot . . . I’m a Vegetarian” timesunion (blog), August 17, 2010. Retrieved 
from https://blog.timesunion.com/healthyprofessor/i-almost-forgot-im-a-vegetarian/249/; Martinez 
{AU: Please create a reference list entry for Martinez 2016 and complete this note.}
52  Haidt, Jonathan, Fredrik Björklund, and Scott Murphy. “Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds 
No Reason,” unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia, 2000; Jonathan Haidt and Matthew A. 
Hersh, “Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals,” Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology 31, no. 1 (2001): 191–221; Edward B. Royzman, Kwanwoo Kim, and Robert F. Leeman, 
“The Curious Tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the Moral Dumbfounding Effect,” Judgment and Decision 
Making 10, no. 4 (2015): 296–313; Uhlmann, Eric L., and Luke [Lei] Zhu, “Acts, Persons, and Intuitions: 
Person-Centered Cues and Gut Reactions to Harmless Transgressions,” Social Psychological and Personality 
Science 5, no. 3 (2014): 279–85.
53  Schnall et al., “Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34, no. 
8 (2008): 1096–1109; Thalia Wheatley and Jonathan Haidt, “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments 
More Severe,” Psychological Science 16, no. 10 (2005): 780–84; Kendall J. Eskine, Natalie A. Kacinik, and 
Jesse J. Prinz, “A Bad Taste in the Mouth: Gustatory Disgust Influences Moral Judgment.” Psychological 
Science 22, no. 3 (2011): 295–99; Simone Schnall, Jennifer Benton, and Sophie Harvey, “With a Clean 
Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces the Severity of Moral Judgments,” Psychological Science 19, no. 12 (2008): 
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Emotional deficits have long been associated with systematically different patterns of 
moral judgment54 and brain areas associated with emotional processing are associated 
with moral judgment (Blair, Marsh, Finger and Blair).55 Reduced emotional salience is 
thought to explain why systematically different moral judgments are made when work-
ing in a second language (Hayakawa, Tannenbaum and Costa, 2017).56 
Two people may know the exact same facts, and even agree about what moral conclu-
sions should be drawn from facts of that kind in the abstract, but come to different 
conclusions in practice, because moral knowledge can rely on the causal influence of an 
emotional response, and the trigger for that response can be forgotten.
However, just because moral judgement is often emotional in nature does not mean that 
it is never reflective. My second example emphasizes this:
(7) Gavin strongly believes that criminals ought to be very heavily punished, 
though he has never interacted with anybody in prison and has no desire to do 
so. Gavin hears on the news one day the case of a convict who was hospitalized 
in prison by beatings by other inmates. Gavin feels some natural sympathy 
for the man who was hurt, but does not think that it’s unfair—prison is a 
1219–22; Piercarlo Valdesolo and David DeSteno, “Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral 
Judgment,” Psychological Science 17, no. 6 (2006): 476–77.
54  R. J. R. Blair, “A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath,” 
Cognition 57, no. 1 (1995): 1–29; for a review, see Mario F. Mendez, “The Neurobiology of Moral Behavior: 
Review and Neuropsychiatric Implications,” CNS Spectrums 14, no. 11 (2009): 608–20.
55  Blair, J., Marsh, A. A., Finger, E., Blair, K. S., & Luo, J. (2006). Neuro-cognitive systems involved in 
morality. Philosophical Explorations; Jean Decety, Kalina J. Michalska, and Katherine D. Kinzler, “The 
Contribution of Emotion and Cognition to Moral Sensitivity: A Neurodevelopmental Study.” Cerebral 
Cortex 22, no. 1 (2011): 209–20; Michael Koenigs et al., “Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases 
Utilitarian Moral Judgements,” Nature 446, no. 7138 (2007): 908–11; Liane Young and Michael Koenigs, 
“Investigating Emotion in Moral Cognition: A Review of Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging and 
Neuropsychology,” British Medical Bulletin 84, no. 1 (2007): 69–79; Joshua D. Greene et al., “An fMRI 
Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science 293, no. 5537 (2001): 2105–8; Joshua 
Greene and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?” Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 6, no. 12 (2002): 517–23;
56  Costa, A., Foucart, A., Hayakawa, S., Aparici, M., Apesteguia, J., Heafner, J., & Keysar, B. (2014). Your 
morals depend on language. PloS one (2014): e94842; Hayakawa, S., Costa, A., Foucart, A., & Keysar, B. 
(2016). Using a foreign language changes our choices. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20 (11), 791-793; 
Hayakawa, Sayuri, David Tannenbaum, Albert Costa, Joanna D. Corey, and Boaz Keysar. “Thinking more 
or feeling less? Explaining the foreign-language effect on moral judgment.” Psychological science 28, no. 
10 (2017): 1387-1397.
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punishment so it is appropriate that it is a dangerous and horrible place to be. 
His friend, Victoria, says that this is bad, that it’s important that all crimes be 
punished equally. Gavin agrees but says that part of the punishment of prison 
is the equal risk of violence by other inmates. This sparks a long debate about 
luck egalitarianism. When considering other cases Gavin strongly feels like 
having an equal chance at something which is determined by luck is not true 
equality—for example, it would not be true that all children have an equal 
chance to succeed in life if, completely randomly, some schools are excellent 
and some are terrible. Considering a variety of such cases, and because Gavin 
wants to be consistent, he decides, in line with his natural sympathy, that the 
beating the hospitalized inmate took was unfair, and that prison being such a 
violent place is not fair. Nonetheless, he maintains that protecting the rights of 
convicted criminals is not a moral priority.
Two weeks later, Gavin is listening to the news on the radio, and hears about 
a pedophile being killed in prison by the other inmates. At first, he thinks that 
this is fine, because after all prison is supposed to be an awful place. He has 
forgotten his discussion with Victoria, as well as his resultant moral belief 
that prisoners harming each other is morally undesirable. Victoria says that 
the death is an injustice, and Gavin is instantly reminded of the conclusion he 
reached after discussion with Victoria.
In the above case I think that it is fair to say that Gavin forgot some moral knowledge. 
The conclusion he reaches on reflection is unobvious in that it differs from his immedi-
ate reaction to the question, so it can be forgotten. Despite all the evidence presented that 
emotion can play a role in forming moral judgments, it is worth noting that immediate 
emotion does a poor job as a comprehensive explanation. For example, while it is im-
pressive that in Wheatley and Haidt some participants gave negative moral evaluation to 
entirely morally neutral behavior because of hypnosis-induced disgust,57 it is important 
to remember that the vast majority felt disgust and yet did not give such an evaluation. 
Similarly, though some studies have found that generalized emotional priming affects 
moral judgment,58 in other situations it appears that the emotion has to have been elicit-
ed in an appropriately relevant way.59 Clearly, the impact of emotion on moral judgment 
reached is being moderated somehow. 
57  Wheatley and Haidt, “Hypnotic Disgust.”
58  Schnall et al., “With a Clean Conscience.”
59  Daniel C. Wisneski and Linda J. Skitka, “Moralization through Moral Shock: Exploring Emotional 
Antecedents to Moral Conviction,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 43, no. 2 (2017): 139–50.
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There is also—as one would expect if moral judgments are sometimes formed through 
reflection—a well-noted effect of time naturally used to make a decision on a moral 
judgment. People naturally have different reaction times depending on their moral 
judgment,60 and moral judgment can be manipulated by altering time available.61 Though 
early accounts that explained this in terms of utilitarian versus deontological respons-
es may be mistaken, and the driving factor is resolution of intuition conflict,62 the fact 
that the time taken to form a moral judgment affects its outcome is not under dispute. 
Directly applying cognitive load to impair reflection also systematically changes moral 
judgments,63 and the tendency toward more reflective decision making generally is as-
sociated with making different kinds of moral judgments.64
It also seems like people try to correct their own moral judgments for biases. Some-
thing as simple as consciously telling participants to be more “rational” as opposed to 
“intuitive” leads to different moral judgments.65 And though people’s moral judgments 
are often affected by factors they themselves consider irrelevant, when presented with 
60  Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation.” 
61  Renata S. Suter and Ralph Hertwig, “Time and Moral Judgment,” Cognition 119, no. 3 (2011): 454–58; 
Denise Dellarosa Cummins and Robert C. Cummins, “Emotion and Deliberative Reasoning in Moral 
Judgment.” Frontiers in Psychology 3, no. 3 (2012): 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00328.
62  Jonathan McGuire et al., “A Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology 
Research.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, no. 3 (2009): 577–80; Jonathan Baron and 
Burcu Gürçay, “A Meta-analysis of Response-Time Tests of the Sequential Two-Systems Model of Moral 
Judgment,” Memory and Cognition 45, no. 4 (2017): 566–75.
63  Joshua D. Greene et al., “Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment,” 
Cognition 107, no. 3 (2008): 1144–54; Bastien Trémolière, Wim De Neys, and Jean-François Bonnefon, 
“Mortality Salience and Morality: Thinking about Death Makes People Less Utilitarian,” Cognition 124, 
no. 3 (2012): 379–84; Bastien Trémolière and Jean-François Bonnefon, “Efficient Kill–Save Ratios Ease 
Up the Cognitive Demands on Counterintuitive Moral Utilitarianism,” Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 40, no. 7 (2014): 923–30; Paul Conway and Bertram Gawronski, “Deontological and Utilitarian 
Inclinations in Moral Decision Making: A Process Dissociation Approach,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 104, no. 2 (2013): 216–35.
64  Edward B. Royzman, Justin F. Landy, and Robert F. Leeman, “Are Thoughtful People More Utilitarian? 
CRT as a Unique Predictor of Moral Minimalism in the Dilemmatic Context,” Cognitive Science 39, no. 2 
(2015): 325–52; Joseph M. Paxton, Leo Ungar, and Joshua D. Greene, “Reflection and Reasoning in Moral 
Judgment,” Cognitive Science 36, no. 1 (2012): 163–77; Joseph M. Paxton, Tommaso Bruni, and Joshua D. 
Greene, “Are ‘Counter-intuitive’ Deontological Judgments Really Counter-intuitive? An Empirical Reply,” 
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 9, no. 9 (2013): 1368–71.
65  David A. Pizarro, Eric Uhlmann, and Paul Bloom, “Causal Deviance and the Attribution of Moral 
Responsibility,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39, no. 6 (2003): 653–60.
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the dilemmas in such a way that this fact becomes obvious they form more consistent 
judgments.66
The very least that can be drawn from this is that formation of moral judgment is not en-
tirely an immediate and direct process. It is often mediated by reflection. Some dual pro-
cess theories emphasize that this is a higher-level so-called System 2 rational process,67 
while others claim that it is merely resolution of conflict of intuitions;68 while others still 
deny this dichotomy.69 What is not in doubt, however, is that moral judgment, and there-
fore moral knowledge also, can involve reflection. This is important because reflections 
can be forgotten—we can forget the conclusions of reflective processes, we can forget 
even to reflect at all in the first place—and in this we have another way in which moral 
knowledge can be lost. 
I leave it as an open question whether the knowledge Gavin has forgotten is formed by 
weighing and considering new intuitions or by some more complex reasoning process, 
but in either case, moral knowledge was forgotten.
It is important that in both cases (Vegan Kim in 6 and Luck Egalitarian Gavin in 7) that 
the agent forgot the moral knowledge and then remembered it after being reminded. 
This is important because of the presence of other behavioral phenomena associated 
with forgetting allows us to be more confident in believing the case is truly one of forget-
66  Tania Lombrozo, “The Role of Moral Commitments in Moral Judgment.” Cognitive Science 33, no. 
2 (2009): 273–86; Eric Luis Uhlmann, David A. Pizarro, David Tannenbaum, and Peter H. Ditto, “The 
Motivated Use of Moral Principles,” Judgment and Decision Making 4, no. 6 (2009): 476–91; Bartels, Daniel 
M. “Principled Moral Sentiment and the Flexibility of Moral Judgment and Decision Making.” Cognition 
108, no. 2 (2008): 381–417.
67  See, for example, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, and Joshua D. Greene, “Our Multi-System Moral 
Psychology: Towards a Consensus View,” in The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, edited by John 
M. Doris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 47–71; and Fiery Cushman, “Action, Outcome, and 
Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 17, no. 3 (2013): 
273–92.
68  See Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment,” Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814–34; and Jonathan Haidt  and Fredrik Björklund, 
“Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Morality,” in Moral Psychology, Vol. 2, edited by Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 118–218 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).
69  See Chelsea Helion and David A. Pizarro, “Beyond Dual-Processes: The Interplay of Reason and 
Emotion in Moral Judgment,” in Handbook of Neuroethics, ed. Jens Clausen and Neil Levy (Dordrecht: 
Springer Netherlands, 2015), 109–25; and Andreas Glöckner and Cilia Witteman, “Beyond Dual-Process 
Models: A Categorisation of Processes Underlying Intuitive Judgement and Decision Making,” Thinking 
and Reasoning 16, no. 1 (2010): 1–25.
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ting and not merely the metaphorical use of language. It is also worth noting that in both 
cases the process that fails to obtain through forgetting is one which is causally part of 
forming the moral judgment. Kim and Gavin did not forget a nonnormative belief used to 
reach a moral conclusion or merely a moralized belief. The beliefs that have been forgot-
ten are themselves true moral beliefs (eating meat is wrong, and prisoners should not be 
harmed by each other).
Fundamentally the point is this: moral judgments do not seem to be formed so unusu-
ally, so the structure would be an unlikely explanation of the absurdity of their being 
forgotten. Most of the previous literature on moral forgetting has focused on extreme ex-
amples of moral forgetting (i.e., forgetting the difference between right and wrong, for-
getting that infidelity is immoral) that they threaten the numerical identity of the agent 
holding the belief. But when we control for the threat to the true self by considering less 
extreme cases of moral forgetting we find cases where moral knowledge can be forgot-
ten. Previous authors have taken the puzzle of moral forgetting to support or challenge 
various views about the nature of moral judgment, but broadly, our intuitions regarding 
moral forgetting’s absurdity are responding to our implicit attitudes about identity, not 
illuminating anything about the nature of moral judgment. Insofar as the intuitive absur-
dity of moral forgetting is taken to be a desideratum regarding the truth of meta-ethical 
theories, neither moral cognitivism nor motivational externalism is challenged.
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend thanks to various people for helping me in reaching this paper as 
it currently stands. Thanks to Robert Cowan for introducing me to the puzzle. Thanks 
also to Victoria Leigh for her helpful comments and encouragement, as well as to two 
anonymous referees for Essays in Philosophy.
References
Aquino, Karl, and Americus Reed. “The Self-Importance of Moral Identity.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 83, no. 6 (2002): 1423–40. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423
Barkan, R., S. Ayal, F. Gino, and D. Ariely. “The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: Distancing Response 
to Ethical Dissonance.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 141, no. 4 (2012): 757–73. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0027588
Baron, Jonathan, and Burcu Gürçay. “A Meta-analysis of Response-Time Tests of the Sequential Two-
Systems Model of Moral Judgment.” Memory and Cognition 45, no. 4 (2017): 566–75. https://doi.
org/10.3758/s13421-016-0686-8
Bilbrough | Memory and the True Self
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1280 | 25
Bartels, Daniel M. “Principled Moral Sentiment and the Flexibility of Moral Judgment and Decision 
Making.” Cognition 108, no. 2 (2008): 381–417. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.001
Blair, R. J. R. “A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath.” 
Cognition 57, no. 1 (1995): 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(95)00676-P
Brink, D. (1989) “Externalist Moral Realism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, suppl. https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9780511624612.004
Bugeja, Adam. “Forgetting Your Scruples.” Philosophical Studies 173, no. 11 (2016): 2889–911. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11098-016-0642-2
Costa, Albert, Alice Foucart, Sayuri Hayakawa, Melani Aparici, Jose Apesteguia, Joy Heafner, and Boaz 
Keysar. “Your Morals Depend on Language.” PloS one, 9, no. 4 (2014): e94842. https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0094842
Conway, Paul, and Johanna Peetz. “When Does Feeling Moral Actually Make You a Better Person? 
Conceptual Abstraction Moderates whether Past Moral Deeds Motivate Consistency or Compensatory 
Behavior.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38, no. 7 (2012): 907–19. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0146167212442394
Conway, Paul, and Bertram Gawronski. “Deontological and Utilitarian Inclinations in Moral Decision 
Making: A Process Dissociation Approach.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 104, no. 2 
(2013): 216–35. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031021
Cummins, Denise Dellarosa, and Robert C. Cummins. “Emotion and Deliberative Reasoning in Moral 
Judgment.” Frontiers in Psychology 3, no. 3 (2012). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00328
Cushman, Fiery. “Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality.” Personality and 
Social Psychology Review 17, no. 3 (2013): 273–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868313495594
Cushman, Fiery, Liane Young, and Joshua D. Greene. “Our Multi-System Moral Psychology: Towards a 
Consensus View.” In The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, edited by John M. Doris, 47–71. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0003
Decety, Jean, Kalina J. Michalska, and Katherine D. Kinzler. “The Contribution of Emotion and 
Cognition to Moral Sensitivity: A Neurodevelopmental Study.” Cerebral Cortex 22, no. 1 (2011): 209–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhr111
De Freitas, Julian, and Mina Cikara. “Deep Down My Enemy Is Good: Thinking about the True Self 
Reduces Intergroup Bias.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 74 (2018): 307–16. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.10.006
De Freitas, J., Sarkissian, H., Newman, G. E., Grossmann, I., De Brigard, F., Luco, A., & Knobe, J. (2017). 
“Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures.” Cognitive 
Science.
Dreier, James. “Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.” Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 
1 (2004): 23–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00019.x
Volume vol-num. Issue Issue-numEssays in Philosophy
26 | eP1280 Essays in Philosophy
Eskine, Kendall J., Natalie A. Kacinik, and Jesse J. Prinz. “A Bad Taste in the Mouth: Gustatory 
Disgust Influences Moral Judgment.” Psychological Science 22, no. 3 (2011): 295–99. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0956797611398497
Festinger, Leon. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Vol. 2. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.
Gibbard, Allan. “Thinking How to Live.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, no. 3 (2006): 
729–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00600.x
Glöckner, Andreas, and Cilia Witteman, “Beyond Dual-Process Models: A Categorisation of Processes 
Underlying Intuitive Judgement and Decision Making.” Thinking and Reasoning 16, no. 1 (2010): 1–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780903395748
Greene, Joshua D., R. Brian Sommerville; Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen. 
“An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.” Science 293, no. 5537 (2001): 
2105–8. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1062872
Greene, Joshua, and Jonathan Haidt. “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?” Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 6, no. 12 (2002): 517–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)02011-9
Greene, Joshua D., Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom, and Jonathan D. Cohen. 
“Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.” Cognition 107, no. 3 (2008): 
1144–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004
Hayakawa, Sayuri, Albert Costa, Alice Foucart, and Boaz Keysar. “Using a Foreign Language Changes 
our Choices.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20, no. 11 (2016): 791–93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
tics.2016.08.004
Hayakawa, S., Tannenbaum, D., Costa, A., Corey, J. D., & Keysar, B. (2017). “Thinking More or Feeling 
Less? Explaining the Foreign-Language Effect on Moral Judgment.” Psychological Science 28, no. 10 
(2017): 1387–97. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617720944
Haidt, Jonathan. “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment.” Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814–34. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814
Haidt, Jonathan, Fredrik Björklund, and Scott Murphy. “Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds 
No Reason.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia, 2000.
Haidt, Jonathan, and Fredrik Björklund. “Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Morality.” In 
Moral Psychology, Vol. 2, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 118–218. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008. 
Hare, R. M. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952.
Heiphetz, Larisa, Nina Strohminger, and Liane L. Young, “The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and 
Preferences in Representations of Identity.” Cognitive Science 41, no. 3 (2017): 744–67. https://doi.
org/10.1111/cogs.12354
Helion, Chelsea, and David A. Pizarro. “Beyond Dual-Processes: The Interplay of Reason and Emotion 
in Moral Judgment.” In Handbook of Neuroethics, edited by Jens Clausen and Neil Levy, 109–25. 
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_160
Bilbrough | Memory and the True Self
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1280 | 27
Kamm, Frances M. “The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend the 
Means to His End.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74, no. 1 (2000): 21–39. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1467-8349.00061
Koenigs, Michael, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser, and 
Antonio Damasio. “Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements.” Nature 
446, no. 7138 (2007): 908–11. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature05631
Lenman, James. (2014) “Moral Naturalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/naturalism-
moral/>.
Lombrozo, Tania. “The Role of Moral Commitments in Moral Judgment.” Cognitive Science 33, no. 2 
(2009): 273–86. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01013.x
Marinello, Nina. “I Almost Forgot . . . I’m a Vegetarian,” timesunion (blog), August 17, 2010. Retrieved 
from https://blog.timesunion.com/healthyprofessor/i-almost-forgot-im-a-vegetarian/249/
McGrath, Sarah. “Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong.” In Intuition, Theory, and Anti-
Theory in Ethics, edited by Sophie Grace Chappell., 104-126. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713227.003.0006
McGuire, Jonathan, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart, and Catriona Mackenzie, “A Reanalysis of the 
Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology Research.” Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 45, no. 3 (2009): 577–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.002
Mendez, Mario F. “The Neurobiology of Moral Behavior: Review and Neuropsychiatric Implications.” 
CNS Spectrums 14, no. 11 (2009): 608–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1092852900023853
Molouki, Sarah, and Daniel M. Bartels, “Personal Change and the Continuity of the Self.” Cognitive 
Psychology 93 (2017): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.11.006
Moore, G. E. (1993). “Moore’s Paradox.” In Baldwin, Thomas. G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. London: Routledge.
Newman, George E., Paul Bloom, and Joshua Knobe. “Value Judgments and the True Self,” Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 40, no. 2 (2014): 203–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213508791
Paxton, Joseph M., Tommaso Bruni, and Joshua D. Greene. “Are ‘Counter-intuitive’ Deontological 
Judgments Really Counter-intuitive? An Empirical Reply.” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 9, 
no. 9 (2013): 1368–71. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst102
Paxton, Joseph M., Leo Ungar, and Joshua D. Greene. “Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment.” 
Cognitive Science 36, no. 1 (2012): 163–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01210.x
Pizarro, David A., Eric Uhlmann, and Paul Bloom. “Causal Deviance and the Attribution of Moral 
Responsibility.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39, no. 6 (2003): 653–60. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00041-6
Prinz, Jesse J., and Shaun Nichols. “Diachronic Identity and the Moral Self,” in The Routledge Handbook 
of Philosophy of the Social Mind, edited by Julian Kiverstein. New York: Routledge, 2016.
Volume vol-num. Issue Issue-numEssays in Philosophy
28 | eP1280 Essays in Philosophy
Rosch, E. (1975). Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 
104, no. 3: 192. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.104.3.192
Royzman, Edward B., Kwanwoo Kim, and Robert F. Leeman. “The Curious Tale of Julie and Mark: 
Unraveling the Moral Dumbfounding Effect.” Judgment and Decision Making 10, no. 4 (2015): 296–313.
Royzman, Edward B., Justin F. Landy, and Robert F. Leeman. “Are Thoughtful People More Utilitarian? 
CRT as a Unique Predictor of Moral Minimalism in the Dilemmatic Context.” Cognitive Science 39, no. 2 
(2015): 325–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12136
Ryle, Gilbert. “On Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong.” In Essays in Moral Philosophy, 
edited by A. I. Melden, 147-159. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958.
Schnall, Simone, Jonathan Haidt, Gerald l. Clore, and Alexander H. Jordan. “Disgust as Embodied 
Moral Judgment.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34, no. 8 (2008): 1096–1109. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0146167208317771
Schnall, Simone, Jennifer Benton, and Sophie Harvey. “With a Clean Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces 
the Severity of Moral Judgments.” Psychological Science 19, no. 12 (2008): 1219–22. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02227.x
Shao, R., Aquino, K., & Freeman, D. (2008). “Beyond Moral Reasoning: A Review of Moral Identity 
Research and Its Implications for Business Ethics.” Business Ethics Quarterly 18, no. 4: 513–40. https://
doi.org/10.5840/beq200818436
Shu, Lisa L., Francesca Gino, and Max Bazerman. “Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: When Cheating 
Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37, 
no. 3 (2011): 330–49. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211398138
Shu, Lisa L., and Francesca Gino. “Sweeping Dishonesty under the Rug: How Unethical Actions Lead 
to Forgetting of Moral Rules.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102, no. 6 (2012): 1164–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028381
Sinhababu, Neil. “The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.” 
Noûs 47 (2013): 680–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00864.x
Sorensen, Roy. Blindspots. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
Strohminger, Nina, and Shaun Nichols. “The Essential Moral Self.” Cognition 131, no. 1 (2014): 159–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.005
Strohminger, Nina, and Shaun Nichols. “Neurodegeneration and Identity.” Psychological Science 26, no. 9 
(2015): 1469–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615592381
Strohminger, Nina, and Shaun Nichols. “Psychopathy and the Moral Self.” Unpublished manuscript, 
2016.
Suter, Renata S., and Ralph Hertwig. “Time and Moral Judgment.” Cognition 119, no. 3 (2011): 454–58. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.018
Bilbrough | Memory and the True Self
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1280 | 29
Tobia, Kevin Patrick. “Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics.” Neuroethics 9, no. 1 
(2016): 37–43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9248-9
Trémolière, Bastien, Wim De Neys, and Jean-François Bonnefon. “Mortality Salience and Morality: 
Thinking about Death Makes People Less Utilitarian.” Cognition 124, no. 3 (2012): 379–84. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.05.011
Trémolière, Bastien, and Jean-François Bonnefon. “Efficient Kill–Save Ratios Ease Up the Cognitive 
Demands on Counterintuitive Moral Utilitarianism.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40, no. 7 
(2014): 923–30. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214530436
Uhlmann, Eric Luis, David A. Pizarro, David Tannenbaum, and Peter H. Ditto. “The Motivated Use of 
Moral Principles.” Judgment and Decision Making 4, no. 6 (2009): 476–91. 
Uhlmann, Eric L., and Luke [Lei] Zhu. “Acts, Persons, and Intuitions: Person-Centered Cues and Gut 
Reactions to Harmless Transgressions.” Social Psychological and Personality Science 5, no. 3 (2014): 
279–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613497238
Valdesolo, Piercarlo, and David DeSteno. “Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral Judgment.” 
Psychological Science 17, no. 6 (2006): 476–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01731.x
Wheatley, Thalia, and Jonathan Haidt. “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe,” 
Psychological Science 16, no. 10 (2005): 780–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01614.x
Williamson, Timothy. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Wisneski, Daniel C., and Linda J. Skitka. “Moralization through Moral Shock: Exploring Emotional 
Antecedents to Moral Conviction.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 43, no. 2 (2017): 139–50. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216676479
Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical Investigations. John Wiley and Sons.
Young, Liane, and Michael Koenigs. “Investigating Emotion in Moral Cognition: A Review of Evidence 
from Functional Neuroimaging and Neuropsychology.” British Medical Bulletin 84, no. 1 (2007): 69–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bmb/ldm031
